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Although the study of motivation is a specialized research
area within the field of psychol< gy, it is an important pursuit
for nearly everyone. People widely engage in the art of untan-
gling the causes of human behavior and stand ready to predict the
future actions of others. Simply stated, the scientific study of
motivation is an organized effort to go beyond these native skills
or common sense in explaining, predicting and possibly controlling
individual behavior.
Typically, explanations of motivational phenomena attempt to
answer questions like, "why does a particular worker spend so much
time at his job," or, "why did one student write a fifty page term
paper when everyone else stopped at ten?" To the layman, these
questions are often answered or behavior "explained" by verbally
linking a given action with a recognized goal or desirable outcome
(Koch, 1956; Lawler, 1973). For example, if person X performs a
given act Y, his behavior can be made intelligible to common sense
by completing the sentence, "X d^d Y in order to...." Thus,
acceptable common sense explanations of a worker's behavior would
be "in order to increase his salary" or "to be promoted to a better
job," while a student's high level of performance could be explained
by a goal to receive the highest grade or please others.
Unfortunately, common sense theorizing rarely constitutes a
scientific explanation of behavior. It does not specify why a
particular goal or end state was valued by an individual or why
a particular goal or end state was chosen to reach the goal. As

noted by Vroora (1964) , the study of motivation by psychologists
has been in large part directed * oward completing this missing
empirical content of common sense reasoning. Basically, the
scientific effort has been one of specifying which objects or
outcomes have value to the individual (e.g., those which reduce
primary, biologically based drives or accomplish ends ultimately
related to these basic needs) , how attraction to various end
states undergoes change (e.g., via deprivation, satiation,
stimulus generalization) , and how behavior directed toward
particular outcomes is acquired, refined and persists over time.
In this paper, we would like to emphasize, as Koch (1956)
has done earlier, that there is an important similarity between
common sense reasoning and scientific theories of motivation.
Inherently, both are based on an assumption of instrumentalism
such that individuals are considered to be doing things for
specifiable ends. For example, two of the most dominant approaches
to the study of motivation, driv theory (Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956)
and expectancy x value theory (Lewin, 1938; Tolman, 1932) include
the notion of a reward or desired outcome and both posit a
learned connection within the organism. For drive theory, this
learned connection is an S-R habit strength, while for expectancy
x value theory, it is a behavior-outcome expectancy which is
perceived by the individual (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and
Weick, 1970) . In sum, the instrumentalism present in motivational
theories is not far removed from the "in order to..." explanation

used by laymen.
The instrumental view of hu*Tan behavior is most readily
apparent in several formulations of the expectancy x value theory
of motivation. As shown in Table 1, the formal statements of
expectancy x value theory specify that motivation is a product
of the valence of a particular goal and the instrumentality of
behavior for reaching the goal. For each theoretical formulation,
Insert Table 1 about here
the individual is assumed to take the shortest or most direct
path toward a valued goal. However, it is important to recognize
that in each case the valued goal is also considered to be external
to the process of "doing" . That is, in analyzing behavior, an
individual will probably be considered to be performing an act
for some goal independent of the activity itself (e.g., higher pay,
a promotion to a better job, etc.) . Unfortunately, these
expectancy x value formulations (like many others in motivational
psychology) do not easily allow for the fact that i worker may
be highly productive simply because he enjoys working hard or is
satisfied by good work. Likewise, the theories do not readily
lead one to an explanation that a student's work is due to a
sheer love of writing or a desire to get something fully explained
regardless of the grade or praise to be received from others.
When viewed in the aggregate, the expectancy x value theories
outlined in Table 1 can be classified as theories of extrinsic
motivation, since, in each, motivation necessitates a specific goal
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which provides satisfaction independent of the activity itself.
However, actions may sometimes r-5 valued for their own sake and
they may be self-sustained without any external inducement. In
these situations, behavior can be said to be intrinsically moti-
vated. Thus, while extrinsic motivation emphasizes the value an
individual places on the ends of an action and the probability of
reaching these ends, intrinsic motivation refers to the pleasure or
value associated with the activity itself. Let us examine more
closely the theoretical and empirical basis of intrinsic motivation
so that we may explicitly build this factor into a revised theory
of motivation.
The Basis of Intrinsic Motivation
Value inherent in behavior . There is strong evidence that many
activities such as manipulation, exploration, and information
processing provide satisfaction in and of themselves. For example,
in some early studies on animal .jehavior, Harlow and his associates
(Harlow, Harlow, and Meyer, 1950; Harlow and McClearn, 1954)
demonstrated that monkeys will learn to disassemble puzzles for
no reward other than the opportunity to manipulate things.
Similarly, Montgomery (1954) showed that rats will systematically
select the path in a mcize which leads to an opportunity to
explore additional mazes. Also, in studies using human subjects,
it has been shown that the absence of stimulation and environmental
change can lead to extreme discomfort. In one of the most vivid
demonstrations of the need for stimulation, Bexton, Heron, and

Scott (1954) employed college students to lie on a cot for 24
hours a day in a sound deadened room (with time out for meals
and toilet needs) . In this study, visual and tactile stimulation
were also minimized since subjects were required to wear trans-
lucent goggles and special gloves. Although the participants
were paid extremely well for their time ($20 in 1954 currency)
,
few persons could tolerate the experiment for as long as two or
three days.
In general, research has shown that in the absence of either
external pleasureful-painful stimulation or basic homeostatic
needs, an individual is not quiescent. In fact, there is some
evidence that shows that it is precisely when external pressures
(e.g., hunger, thirst, sex) are minimized that play, exploration,
manipulation, and curiousity behaviors are most likely to be
manifested (Hunt, 1965). As a result of these findings, several
psychologists have gone as far as to posit new human needs for
manipulation (Karlow and McClear: , 1954) , exploration (Montgomery,
1954) , and curiousity (Berlyne, 1960) . Tasks which engage these
needs can thus be considered to be intrinsically motivating since
the activity provides value to the individual independent of any
external sources of satisfaction.
Value inherent in accomplishment . In addition to the value an
individual may derive from the physical or mental activities
involved in a task, satisfaction may also result from knowing
that one's efforts have led to a completed product or accomplish-

ment. McClelland (1951,1961) has conceptualized this source of
satisfaction as the fulfillment cf a need for achievement. Using
a projective test (the TAT) to assess the strength of achievement
motivation, it has been shown that situations which involve
competition or the testing of one's abilities produce the greatest
motive arousal. A learned drive to achieve is thought to be
activated when performance can be readily evaluated as a success
or failure, and the affect potentially associated with a task
(incentive value of success) is hypothesized to be a function of
both the strength of this achievement need and the probability
of success. The greatest satisfaction or pride in accomplishment
would therefore be derived by persons with high needs for achieve-
ment who are successful in performing a difficult task (see
Litwin, 1966, and Cook, 1970 for empirical tests of this hypothesis).
Also consistent with the notion that many people seek out or
value accomplishment are the theoretical statements of White (1959)
and Maslow (1954, 1970). White j.osits that individuals are
motivated toward competence or mastery over their environments—that
persons not only manipulate and explore their surroundings but
strive to master them through higher levels of motor and mental
coordination. In a similar vein, Maslow states that many individ-
uals possess active higher order needs for esteem and self-actu-
alization. Esteem needs include a need for personal feelings of
achievement or success, while a self-actualization need is
considered to be a striving for personal growth and development

3by one's own actions. Thus, like McClelland* s formulation of
achievement motivation, both White's and Maslow's theoretical
statements suggest that individuals may be motivated to perform
certain tasks without an apparent need for external rewards.
If a task involves the opportunity for one to use new skills or
is challenging to one's ability, it may therefore provide satis-
faction in and of itself.
A Revised Expectancy x Value Theory of Motivation
Although expectancy x value theories were originally conceived
as models of extrinsic motivation, they can be amended to include
intrinsic factors. As we have seen, it is important to recognize
two sources of individual satisfaction that are not generally
included in an expectancy x value model. First, a person may
work on a task merely for the activity and stimulation involved
regardless of whether his actions lead to a specific accomplishment
or tangible rewards provided by others. Secondly, individual
accomplishments may provide satisfaction to the individual regard-
less of whether they lead to external rewards such as money,
praise, or increased status. Thus, we may think of task
performance as involving three distinct sources of value to an
individual: 1) value associated with a behavior itself, 2) value
associated with accomplishment, and 3) value associated with rewards
presented by others. The first two sources of value are mediated
by the individual and can be considered intrinsic to his performance,

while the third comprises an extrinsic source of satisfaction.
Several recent formulations of task motivation within
organizational settings have incorporated intrinsic as well as
extrinsic factors into the expectancy x value framework. Galbraith
and Cummings (1957), Porter and Lawler (1967), and Lawler (1971,
1973) have each noted that task accomplishment can be rewarding to
an individual independent of any externally mediated rewards.
However, their models of motivation have each defined intrinsic
rewards as those derived only from achievement, and they have not
specifically considered the intrinsic rewards associated with
behavior irrespective of any task accomplishment. A recent
expectancy model put forth by House and his associates (House,
1971; House, Shapiro, and Wahba, 1974) is most inclusive in that
it specifies both of these potential sources of intrinsic
motivation. A slightly amended version of the model is presented
below:
n
M = IV + (P.) (IV. ) + t E (P„.) (EV.)J
a l r> . , Zx i
l-l
i = 1, ... n
where:
M = task motivation
IV = intrinsic valence a^3sociatcd v/ith task behavior
a
IV = intrinsic valence associated with task accomplishment
EV. = extrinsic valences associated with task accomplishment
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P = perceived probability that one's behavior will lead to
accomplishment of the task
P • = perceived probabilities that one's task accomplishment will
lead to extrinsic valences
House's theory of task motivation posits that the individual
estimates the instrumentality of his behavior,, P , for accomplish-
ing a task goal and also the likelihood, P , that a task accomplish-
ment will lead to valued extrinsic rewards. In assessing P ,
the individual may take into consideration such factors as the
level of his abilities relevent to the task/ barriers to work
goal accomplishment in the environment (e.g., not getting sxiffieient
materials to finish a job correctly) , and the help or support he
will receive from others in the work setting. In assessing P ,
the individual may consider the likelihood that his supervisor
will recognize good performance through praise , favoratism, a
monetary raise, or promotion to a better job. In addition, the
individual is assumed to place some subjective value upon the
behaviors involved in task performance, task accomplishment, and
the extrinsic rewards potentially available via work performance.
Thus, a worker who is bored at home may possess a high IV , a
a.
worker who has a high need for achievement will be high on IV
,
while the person in dire need of a bigger paycheck should have
a high EV.. We will make use of this revised version of expectancy
x value theory in predicting individual task motivation and
formulating specific strategies for changing motivation.
3
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Methods of Increasing Task Motivation; Extrinsic Factors
Probably the most prevalent action individuals take to
change another's task behavior is to alter extrinsic motivation.
From the expectancy x value model presented above, we can see
that extrinsic motivation can be increased by changing either
the extrinsic valences associated with task accomplishment (EV.),
or, the perceived probabilities linking accomplishment to rewards
(P
2i !
•
One procedure by which the valence of extrinsic rewards can
be altered is through deprivation. Numerous laboratory studies
have shown that by depriving a subject of a valued commodity (e.g.,
food, water, sex) , motivation can be increased for any task which
leads to its attainment. No doubt, the same principal holds in
everyday life. However, the use of deprivation to motivate
someone to perform a task is not recommended. Today, deprivation
is considered an ethically undesirable way to change behavior,
and, fortunately, few allocators of rewards have the amount of
control over the lives of others necessary to use it successfully.
At present, for example, if an industrial firm chose to restrict
the pay of workers, it would, in addition to increasing the
perceived value of money, cause workers to transfer quickly to
another job. Only when the worker's options are extremely limited
(as during periods of high unemployment or a government controlled
labor market) would deprivation be an effective motivational
tool.
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A preferable way to increase extrinsic motivation is to assess
the desires or needs of the individuals performing a task, and to
make available those extrinsic rewards with the greatest utility.
For instance, one purpose of periodic meetings between supervisors
and subordinates within small task groups and attitude surveys
within large organizations could be to assess regularly the
changing needs of employees. Ideally, extrinsic rewards could
be tailored to groups of individuals with similar needs (e.g.,
for security, money, verbal praise) or provided on an individual
basis. By simply restructuring the mix of rewards to achieve
the greatest extrinsic valences, motivation to perform a task
could thus be increased, (see Lawler, 1971 for discussion of
"cafeteria style" pay schemes as applied to industry)
.
In addition to the valences associated with extrinsic rewards,
considerable attention should also be given to the perceived
probability that task accomplishment will lead to rewards. The
most effective procedure in terms of increasing motivation is
to make rewards contingent upon performance. As shown in Fugure 1,
dramatic changes in behavior can result from tying extrinsic
rewards to behavior. Depicted in the figure is the level of
desired behavior emitted by patients of a mental hospital when
rewards are both contingent and non-contingent on behavior.
The extrinsic rewards used in the study were tokens which could
be exchanged for food, cigarettes, or other valued commodities.
Insert Figure 1 about here
In practice, there are many ways of designing a contingent
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reward system. When task accomplishments are easily defined and
measurable, it is often feasible to institute some sort of piece-
rate incentive system. In these cases, the level of extrinsic
rewards is based upon the quantity and/or quality of performance.
Often, however, task accomplishments are neither clearly defined
nor easily measured. In these cases, a judgment of the individual's
performance is required by a supervisor or allocator of rewards.
Obviously, any error in evaluation or sudden change in the criteria
of performance will sharply reduce the individual's perception
that task accomplishment leads to rewards. As a consequence,
the perceived objectivity or fairness of the appraisal system can
be as important a determinant of the individual's task motivation
as the actual contingency between rewards and performance.
Making valued extrinsic rewards contingent upon performance
is generally an effective motivational strategy. However, it
is not without some problems. First, it requires that a supervisor
possess a sufficient quantity of extrinsic rewards to motivate
workers to get a task completed. While most formal organizations
(e.g., industry, government) can afford to literally purchase a
worker's services, a lack of valued extrinsic rewards can present
a motivational problem for many informal work settings (e.g.,
social clubs, volunteer organizations, home environment) . Also,
as discussed, an effective strategy of extrinsic motivation
requires that performance be accurately assessed by supervisors so
that rewards can be dispensed on a contingent basis. Although
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this is no problem on a routine task in which the supervisor
can clearly set trie criteria of performance and measure it,
frequently (on tasks involving a great deal of skill and
creativity) the supervisor may actually know less about the job
than the worker and be in a very poor position to evaluate his
performance.
Methods of Increasing Task Motivation; Intrinsic Factors
From the revised expectancy x value model we can see that
intrinsic motivation results from the perception of rewards
which axe inherent in either task behavior (IV ) or accomplishment:
a
(IV ) . Several factors can be expected to account for the
intrinsic valences associated with both behavior and accomplish-
ment, but not all of them are easily alterable. For example,
it would be most difficult to change individual needs for
activity, manipulation, or exploration, except on a temporary
basis. McClelland and his associates have had some success in
increasing individual's achievement needs and motivating entre-
preneurial behavior through intensive training sessions (see
McClelland and Winter, 1967) . However, it is doubtful that
achievement motivation can, by itself, affect the performance of
persons on routine organizational tasks or other activities
which are not highly achievement oriented (McClelland, 1973a;
1973b)
.
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Perhaps the most practical method of increasing a person's
intrinsic motivation to perform a task is to purposely alter the
characteristics of the work activities he faces. Assuming that
individuals possess at least a moderate need for activity and
achievement, many tasks can be changed so that individuals derive
greater satisfaction from either their task behavior or accomplish-
ment. Many industrial firms have, in effect, followed these
principles in programs of job enlargement and job enrichment.
For example, the intrinsic rewards associated with task behavior
are often improved by increasing the variety of skills necessary
to perform a task or by rotating workers among several different
tasks. Similarly, the intrinsic rewards associated with task
accomplishment can be improved by increasing the responsibility
of workers or the importance of the tasks they perform.
Increasing intrinsic motivation has several advantages as
a motivational strategy. When individuals can derive satisfaction
from task behaviors or accomplishment, there may, for example,
be a reduced need for extrinsic rewards to motivate behavior.
This may be especially important in cases where supervisors have
a limited supply of extrinsic inducements or where individuals
do not value those that are readily available. A second advantage
of intrinsic motivation is that the need to monitor another's
task behavior is reduced. With intrinsic motivation, it may not
be necessary to rely totally upon piece-rate incentive systems
or periodic performance appraisals to induce a high level of task
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performance. Instead, a task can be designed so that the quantity
and/or quality of performance fulfills the individual's needs
for achievement. When this is done, the worker who values
achievement can monitor his own task accomplishment and reward
himself on a completely contingent basis.
There are a number of ways a task can be changed to increase
intrinsic motivation and some of the most important ones are
listed in Figure 2. The job characteristics shown in the figure
are based heavily upon the recent research and theory of Hackman
and Oldham (in press), but are framed within House's (1971) model
of motivation as discussed earlier. It should be noted that the
research underlying the model presented here has been conducted
largely within industrial organizations. However, the character-
istics of tasks are stated in rather general terms and may be
applicable to many other settings (e.g., educational organizations).
A brief consideration of each of these task characteristics and how
they might be altered is listed below.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Task variety . In order to increase the intrinsic valence
associated with task behavior (IVa ) , greater variety can
often be introduced into a job. A greater assortment of
tasks can be performed by the individual on a single job
or, if this is impossible, he can be rotated periodically
from job to job. Many industrial firms have followed
this procedure in reducing boredom, and increases in task
satisfaction commonly result from such changes. Within
educational organizations, a similar increase in the
variety of learning tasks can often be used to maintain
student interest.
Task uncertainty . Very mechanistic tasks, even if they com-
prise a varied set of activities, may not be totally satisfy-
ing to most individuals. Because of our needs for exploration
and cognitive stimulation, a task which involves information
processing and/or the resolution of uncertainty may be of
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greater intrinsic interest (e.g., Hunt, 1971; Lanzetta, 1970).
Obviously, there may be some upper limit to the degree of un-
certainty which is satisfying to an individual. Both the
individual's level of task-relevant skills needed to resolve
uncertainty and his personal tolerance for ambiguity may there-
fore determine the optimal task design.
Social interaction inherent to the job . Individuals
generally derive satisfaction from interacting with
others and this source of satisfaction can be an
important inducement for working. For most persons,
the intrinsic valence associated with task behavior is
greater when social interaction is an integral part
of the job. The formation of task groups and exchange
of information are techniques used by schools for
increasing the intrinsic interest of students. Also,
within industry, there are now experiments in which
previously isolated workers can increase their contact
with the ultimate users of their services as well as
their co-workers (see Hackman, Oldham, Janson, Purdy,
in press)
.
Task significance . The intrinsic valence associated with
task accomplishment (IV ) can often be improved by
increasing the perceived significance of a person's
work output. This can be done by either changing the
individual to a more important job or by increasing
the salience of his present work output. An example
of the latter course of action would be to continually
emphasize the usefulness of the person's work or to
place the person in direct contact with the ultimate
users of his product. Within the educational setting,
an increase of task significance may translate itself
into a stress for "relevance" in learning activities.
Task identity . Another way to improve the intrinsic
valence associated with task accomplishment might be
to increase the "wholeness" or identity of a person's
work output. At present, within industry, many jobs
are so specialized that the worker cannot see the
relationship between his small task and the final
finished product. In order to increase task identity,
jobs can often be redesigned. The individual can be
allowed to produce a larger module of work or a small
team of workers can be formed to complete an entire
assembly process.
Responsibility for results . If an individual does not
feel responsible for his work output, it is doubtful
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whether he will place a high value on task accomplishment.
Only when the person can experience success or failure
on a task is he likely to value the intrinsic rewards
associated with accomplishment. Therefore, to increase
intrinsic motivation, the person might be given a larger
amount of discretion over his task activities and held
more accountable for his results. In industry, the
autonomy of workers is often increased by allowing them
to schedule their own work activities, decide on work
methods, and check the quality of their own output.
Quite similar procedures could be devised within a
school environment in order to increase the felt
responsibility of students for their own learning.
Barriers to task accomplishment . Within any work setting
(e.g., industrial, educational, etc.) the perceived
probability that task, behavior leads to accomplishment
(P2> may depend on the extent to which there are
barriers to task accomplishment. Some of these barriers
may be internal to the individual such as his ability
or training to perform a task, while many others may
be related to his immediate task environment (e.g. , not
getting the necessary material or social support
necessary to complete the job) . Restructuring a job
(or educational task) so as to remove external barriers
to accomplishment and providing requisite training and
supervision may thus serve to increase an individual's
intrinsic motivation.
Knowledge of results . Knowledge of results can also
be expected to affect a person's intrinsic motivation
to perform a task. Clearly, if the individual receives
no feedback as to the quality of his performance,
it will be difficult for him to derive satisfaction
from accomplishment . Thus, it is important for
supervisors to relate to workers exactly how they are
doing. This feedback should be on a continuous basis
so that the individual can quickly change his behavior
and not merely on a per iodic review basis. Ideally,
a feedback system should be built into the work itself.
At present, many industrial tasks do contain their own
quality checks which can be performed by the worker,
and, within the educational context, computerized
instruction provides a good example of learning tasks
in which immediate feedback is provided so that
changes in behavior can be effected by the individual
.
ffects of intrinsic motivation. Figure 2 shows that intrinsic
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motivation can influence both an individual's task attitudes and
behavior. If the individual values the behaviors associated
with a task actively (IV ), he can be expected to participate
el
in the task, be satisfied with it, and perhaps even to volunteer
for additional tasks of a similar nature- If the individual
values task accomplishment and perceives a strong link between
his behavior and accomplishment [(IV, ) (P, ) 1 , he can also beb 1
expected to produce high quality work. Empirical support for
these hypotheses is derived from research on both task design
and work effectiveness within organizational settings (see
Hackman and Lawler, 1971; Hackman and Oldham, in press; House,
1971; Oldham, 1974)
.
Combining Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
It is apparent from our discussion that, both intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation can be effective methods of energizing
behavior. Either of these motivational strategies can be used
to get an individual to perform a task, and both intrinsic and
extrinsic rewards can bring satisfaction to the individual.
The question remains, however, if these two sources of motivation
can be combined effectively to yield overall positive effects
on the individual's task attitudes and behavior.
In the expectancy x value model presented above, intrinsic
and extrinsic factors are added to form an overall measure of
motivation. This model, like those of Galbraith and Cummings
(1967), Porter and Lawler (1967), and Lawler (1971, 1973) assumes
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that the perception of intrinsic rewards and the perception of
extrinsic rewards are additive in their effect, on anticipated
work satisfaction. It assumes that intrinsic motivation
n
[{IV ) + (P, ) (TV, )1 and extrinsic motivation [ 2 (P > (EV.)]alb
. ,
2x x
x.—l , . . . n
sursnate to produce overall task motivation, and that intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation are separate, independent factors.
Whether or not intrinsic and extrinsic sources of motivation
are independent or do in fact 'have an effect upon each other is
a question of considerable practical as well as theoretical
significance. For example, if they are positively interrelated,
then we might expect that extrinsic rewards will increase a
person's intrinsic interest in a task, whereas, if they are
negatively interrelated, the administration of an extrinsic
reward could drive out intrinsic motivation. This issue is of
importance to any setting (e.g., industrial organizations,
schools, or voluntary work situations) in which extrinsic
rewards are administered and the allocator of the rewards is
interested in the individual's resultant task attitudes and
behavior.
The Interrelationship of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
Historically, the interrelationship of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation has been the subject of considerable
controversy. In fact, it can be said that there exist psychologi-
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cal theories which will predict either a positive relationship
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, a negative relationship,
or no relationship at all. As a consequence, we will examine
each of these theoretical positions in some detail, and, in the
light of recent empirical research, attempt to formulate a
unified view of the interrelationship between intrinsic and
extrinsic factors.
Long ago, Woodworth (1918) suggested that in the process
of acquiring a set of skills toward some end, the skills themselves
could develop their own motivating force which might endure
even after the end is no longer sought. He stated this point
in reference to mastering a business as follows:
. . . while a man may enter a certain line of
business from a purely external economic motive, he
develops an interest in the business for its own
sake. . .and the motive force that drives him in the
daily task, provided of course this does not degenerate
into mere automatic routine, is precisely an interest
in the problems confronting him and in the processes
by which he is able to deal with those problems.
The end furnishes the motive force for the search for
means but once the means are found, they are apt to
become interesting on their own account (p. 104}
.
Allport (1937) has argued in a similar vein that certain behaviors
develop their own motive power or "functional autonomy". He
noted that while many activities such as making money, solving
problems, etc., may have originally served some other motive,
their persistence in many people despite an absence of external
forces necessitates their having developed value on their own.
The notion that an activity or task behavior can become
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valued by an individual through its continued association with an
external reward can be explained by the process of secondary
reinforcement. Secondary reinforcement refers to a process by
which an originally neutral stimulus acquires reinforcing
properties through its pairing with a primary reinforcer (see
Keller, 1969; Ferster and Skinner, 1969; Uhl and Young, 1967)
.
Thus, in these terms, it is possible to assert that an intrinsically
motivating activity is simply one in which the reinforcement
value of an extrinsic goal has associatively rubbed off on the
behavior. Irrespective of temporal considerations (i.e., how
long it might take for an activity to acquire reinforcing
properties on its own) one can therefore predict, through
secondary reinforcement, that there will be a positive relationship
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In short, no matter
what one's original reaction to a task is, secondary reinforcement
predicts that it may improve over time if it leads to valued
extrinsic rewards.
Other psychologists, as we have seen, might disagree with
the notion that all activities which are currently valued by
individuals are merely those which have previously led to
positive external outcomes. As noted by Harlow (1950) , Montgomery
(1954) , and Berlyne (1960) , an intrinsically motivated activity
may stem from an innate human need for stimulation, information,
or knowledge and is not necessarily dependent upon external
reinforcement. Since certain activities may be valued independently
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of homeostatic needs or acquired drives based upon them, we
might therefore posit that there is no clear relationship
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
A New Approach to the Problem
Recently, there has begun an investigation into the relation-
ship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from an entirely
different perspective. Instead of asking how intrinsic motivation
might be derived from extrinsic reward contingencies or independent
human motives, several researchers have concluded that both
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation may be more usefully studied
as perceptions on the part of individuals. From a perceptual
approach, it is not necessary to know how specific behaviors
originally acquired reinforcing properties, but only that an
individual at a given point in time may perceive a task to be
rewarding in and of itself. That is, if individuals think they
are intrinsically motivated, this self-perception alone may be
enough to influence future behavior and attitudes. This new
approach is consistent with our expectancy x value formulation
of motivation, since in the model, individuals are assumed to
hold perceptions of rewards to be derived from their actions,
and behavior is assumed to be based on the direction and magnitude
of these perceptual states.
Within the area of interpersonal perception, it has been
noted (see Heider, 1958) that an individual may infer the causes
of another's actions to be a function of personal and environmental
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force
:
Action = f (personal force + environmental force)
This is quite close to saying that individuals attempt to determine
whether another person is intrinsically motivated to perform
an activity (action due to personal force) or extrinsically
motivated (action due to environmental force) , or both. The
extent to which an individual will infer intrinsic motivation on
the part of another is predicted to be affected by the clarity
and strength of external forces within the situation (Kelley,
1967; Jones and Davis, 1965). When there are strong forces
bearing on the individual to perform an activity there is little
reason to assume that a behavior is self-determined, while a
high level of intrinsic motivation might be infered if environmental
force is minimal. Several studies dealing with interpersonal
perception have supported this general conclusion (see Jones,
Davis, and Gergen, 1961; Thibaut and Riecken, 1955; Jones and
Harris, 1967; Strickland, 1958) .
In 1967, Bern extrapolated this interpersonal theory of
causal attribution to the study of self-perception or how one
views his own behavior within a social context. Bern hypothesized
that the extent to which external pressures are sufficiently
strong to account for one's behavior will determine the likelihood
that a person will attribute his own actions to internal causes.
Thus, if a person acts under strong external rewards or punish-
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merits, he is likely to assume that his behavior is under external
control. However, if extrinsic contingencies are not strong
or salient, the individual is likely to assume that his behavior
is due to his own interest in the activity or that his behavior
is intrinsically motivated, de Charms has made a similar point
in his discussion of individuals' perception of personal causation:
As a first approximation, we propose that when-
ever a person experiences himself to be the locus of
causality for his own behavior (to be an Origin)
,
he will consider himself to be intrinsically motivated.
Conversely, when a person perceives the locus of
causality for his behavior to be external to himself
(that he is a Pawn), he will consider himself to be
extrinsically motivated (1968, p. 328)
.
de Charms emphasized that the individual may attempt to psychologically
label his actions on the basis of whether or not he has been
instrumental in affecting his own behavior; that is, whether his
behavior has been intrinsically or extrinsically motivated.
The Case for a Negative Relationship between Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Motivation
The self-perception approach to intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation leads one to the conclusion that there may be a
negative interrelationship between these two motivational factors.
The basis for this prediction stems from the assumption that
individuals may work backward from their own actions in infering
sources of causation (Bern, 1967; 1972) . For example, if external
pressures on an individual are so high that they would ordinarily
cause him to perform a given task regardless of the internal
characteristics of the activity, then the individual might
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logically infer that he is extrinsically motivated. In contrast,
if external reward contingencies are extremely low or non- salient,
one might then infer that his behavior is intrinsically motivated.
What is important is the fact that the individual, in performing
an activity, may seek out the probable cause for his own actions.
Since behavior has no doubt been caused by something, it makes
pragmatic, if not scientific, sense for a person to infer personal
causation (intrinsic motivation) to the extent that any external
source of causation (extrinsic motivation) is absent.
There are two particular situations which provide robust
tests of the self-perception prediction. One is a situation
in which there is insufficient justification for a person's
actions, a situation in which the intrinsic rewards for an
activity are very low (e.g., a dull task) and there are no
compensating extrinsic rewards (e.g., no monetary payment,
verbal praise, etc.). Although rationally, one ordinarily tries
to avoid these situations, there are occasions in which a person
is faced with the difficult question of "why did I do that?".
The self-perception theory predicts that in situations of insufficient
justification the individual may cognitively reevaluate the
intrinsic characteristics of an activity in order to justify
or explain his own behavior. For example, if the individual
performed a dull task for no external reward he may "explain"
his behavior by thinking that the task was not really so bad
after all.
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Sometimes, a person may also be fortunate enough to be in
a situation in which his behavior is over sufficiently justified.
For example, a person may be asked to perform an interesting task
and at the same time be lavishly paid for his efforts. In such
situations, the self-perception theory predicts that the individual
may actually reevaluate the activity in a downward direction.
Since the external reward would be sufficient to motivate behavior
by itself, the individual may mistakenly infer that he was
extrinsically motivated to perform the activity. He may conclude
that since he was forced to perform the task by an external
reward, the task probably was not terribly satisfying in and of
itself.
Figure 3 graphically depicts both the situations of insuffi-
cient and overly sufficient justification. From the figure,
Figure 3 about here
we can see that the conceptual framework supporting self-perception
theory raises several interesting issues. First, it appears
from this analysis that there are only two fully stable attributions
of behavior: 1) The perception of extrinsically motivated behavior
in which the internal rewards associated with performing an
activity are low while external rewards are high; and 2) The
perception of intrinsically motivated behavior in which the task
is inherently rewarding but external rewards are low. Furthermore,
it appears that situations of insufficient justification (where
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards are both low) and oversufficient
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justification (where intrinsic and extrinsic rewards are both
high) involve unstable attribution states. As shown in Figure 4,
individuals apparently resolve this attributional instability by
altering their perceptions of intrinsic rewards associated with
the task.
Insert Figure 4 about here
An interesting question posed by the self-perception analysis
is why are individuals predicted to resolve an unstable attribution
state by cognitively reevaluating a task in terms of its intrinsic
rewards rather than changing their perceptions of extrinsic
factors. The answer to this question may lie in the relative
clarity of extrinsic as compared to intrinsic rewards, and the
individual's relative ability to distort the two aspects of the
situation. Within many settings (and especially within laboratory
experiments) the conditions of extrinsic rewards are generally
quite salient and specific, while persons must judge the intrinsic
nature of a task for themselves. Consequently, any shifts in the
perception of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards may be more likely
to occur in the intrinsic factor. As shown in Figure 4, it is
these predicted shifts in perceived intrinsic rewards which may
theoretically underlie a negative relationship between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation.
Empirical Evidence: Insufficient Justification
Several studies have shown that when an individual is induced
to commit an unpleasant act for little or no external justification
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he may subsequently conclude that the act was not so unpleasant
after all. Actually, the first theory to account for this phenomenon
was the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) . It
was predicted by dissonance theorists (Festinger, 1957; Aronson,
1966) that, since performing an unpleasant act for little or no
reward would be an inconsistent (and seemingly irrational) thing
to do, an individual might subsequently change his attitude
toward the act in order to reduce the inconsistency or to appear
rational. Bern's self-perception theory yields the same predictions
but does not require one to posit that there is a motivating state
such as dissonance reduction or self rationalization. To Bern,
since the individual examines his own behavior in light of the
forces around him, he is simply more likely to come to the conclusion
that his actions were intrinsically satisfying if they had been
performed under minimal external force.
Generally, there have been two types of experiments designed
to assess the consequences of insufficient justification. One
type of design has involved the performance of a dull task under
varied levels of reward (e.g., Brehm and Cohen, 1959; Weick, 1964;
Freedman, 1963; Weick and Penner, 1965) . A second, more popular
design, has involved some form of counter-attitudinal advocacy,
either in terms of lying to a fellow subject about the nature
of an experiment or writing an essay against one's position on
an important issue (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Carlsmith,
Collins and Helmreich, 1966; Linder, Cooper and Jones, 1967)
.
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Fundamentally, the two types of designs are not vastly different.
They uniformly have required subjects to perform an intrinsically
dissatisfying act under varied levels of external inducement,
and they uniformly have predicted that, in the low payment
condition, the subject will change his attitude toward the
activity (i.e., think more favorably of the task or begin to
believe the position advocated)
.
The most well-known experiment designed to test the insuffi-
cient justification paradigm was conducted by Festinger and
Carlsmith (1959) . Subjects participated in a repetive and dull
task (putting spools on trays and turning pegs) and were asked
to tell other waiting subjects that the experiment was enjoyable,
interesting, and exciting. Half of the experimental subjects
were paid $1.00 and half were paid $20.00 for the counter-
attitudinal advocacy (and to be "on call" in the future) , while
control subjects were neither paid nor performed the counter-
attitudinal act. As predicted, the smaller the reward that was
used to induce subjects to perform the counter-attitudinal act,
the greater was the positive change in their attitudes toward
the task. Although the interpretation of the results of this
study have been actively debated (e.g., between dissonance
versus self-perception theorists) the basic findings have been
replicated by a number of different researchers. It should be
noted, however, that several mediating variables have also been
isolated as being necessary for the attainment of this dissonance
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or self-perception effect: free choice (Linder, Cooper and Jones,
1966) , commitment or irrevocability of behavior (Brehm and Cohen,
1962) , and substantial adverse consequences (Calder, Ross and
Insko, 1973; Collins and Hoyt, 1972).
Recently, a strong test of the insufficient justification
paradigm was also conducted outside the laboratory (see Staw,
1974) . A natural field experiment was made possible by the fact
that many young men had joined an organization (Army R.O.T.C.)
in order to avoid being drafted, and , these same young men
subsequently received information (a draft lottery number) which
changed the value of this organizational reward. Of particular
relevance was the fact that persons who joined R.O.T.C, did so
not because of their intrinsic interest in the activities involved
(e.g., drills, classes, and summer camp), but because they
anticipated a substantial extrinsic reward (draft avoidance)
.
As a result, persons who received draft numbers which exempted
them from military service subsequently faced a situation of low
extrinsic as well as intrinsic rewards, a situation of insufficient
justification. In contrast, persons who received draft numbers
which made them vulnerable to military call-up, found their
participation in R.O.T.C. perfectly justified—they were still
successfully avoiding the draft by remaining in the Reserve
Officer Training Corps. To test the insufficient justification
effect, both the attitudes and performance of R.O.T.C. cadets
were analyzed by draft number before and after the national draft
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lottery. The results showed that persons in the insufficient
justification condition enhanced their perception of R.O.T.C.
and even performed somewhat better in R.O.T.C. courses after the
lottery. It should be recognized, however,, that this task
enhancement occurred only under very similar circumstances to
those previously found necessary for the dissonance or self-
perception effect (i.e., high commitment, choice, and adverse
consequences)
.
Empirical Evidence: Overly Sufficient Justification
There have been several empirical studies designed to test
the self-perception prediction within the context of overly
sufficient justification. Generally, a situation in which an
extrinsic reward is added to an intrinsically rewarding task
has been experimentally contrived for this purpose. Following
self-perception theory, it is predicted that an increase in
external justification will cause individuals to lose confidence
in their intrinsic interest in the experimental task. Since
dissonance theory cannot make this prediction (it is neither
irrational nor inconsistent to perform an activity for too many
rewards) , the literature on overly sufficient justification provides
the most important data on the self-perception prediction. For
this reason, we will examine the experimental evidence in some
detail.
In an experiment specifically designed to test the effect of
overly sufficient justification on intrinsic motivation, Deci
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(1971) enlisted a number of college students to participate in a
problem- solving study. All of the students were asked to work
on a series of intrinsically interesting puzzles for three
experimental sessions. After the first session, however, one-half
of the students (the experimental group) were told that they would
also be given an extrinsic reward (money) for correctly solving
the second set of puzzles, while the other half of the students
(the control group) were not told anything about the reward. In
the third session, neither the experimental nor the control
subjects were rewarded. This design is schematically outlined
below:
Basic Design of Deci (1971) Study
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
Experimental Group No Payment Payment No Payment
Control Group No Payment No Payment No Payment
Deci had hypothesized that the payment of money in the second
experimental session might decrease subjects' intrinsic motivation
to perform the task. That is, the introduction of an external
force (money) might cause participants to alter their self-
perception about why they are working on the puzzles. Instead of
being intrinsically motivated to solve the interesting puzzles,
they might find themselves working primarily to get the money
provided by the experimenter. Thus, Deci's goal in conducting
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the study was to compare the changes in subjects' intrinsic
motivation from the first to third sessions for both the experimental
and control groups. If the self-perception hypothesis were correct,
the intrinsic motivation of the previously paid experimental
subjects would be expected to decrease in the third session,
while the intrinsic motivation of the unpaid controls should
remain unchanged.
As a measure of intrinsic motivation Deci used the amount
of free time participants spent on the puzzle task. To obtain
this measure, the experimenter left the room during each session
supposedly to feed some data into the computer. As the experimenter
left the room, he told the subjects that they could do anything
they wanted with their free time, and, in addition to the puzzles,
current issues of Time, New Yorker
, and Playboy were placed near
the subject. However, as he left the laboratory, a second
experimenter (unknown to the subject) observed the subject's
behavior from behind a one-way mirror. It was reasoned that if
the subject worked on the puzzles during this free time period
when he could do other things, then he must be intrinsically
motivated to perform the task. As shown in Table 2, the amount
of free time spent on the task decreased for persons who were
previously paid to perform the activity, while there was a slight
increase for the unpaid controls. Although the difference
between the experimental and control groups was only marginally
significant, the results are suggestive of the fact that an overly
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sufficient extrinsic reward may decrease one's intrinsic motivation
to perform a task.
Insert Table 2 about here
Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973) also conducted a study
which tests the self-perception prediction in a situation of
overly sufficient justification. Their study involved having
nursery school children perform an interesting activity, playing
with magic markers, with and without the expectation of an
additional extrinsic reward. Some children were induced to draw
pictures with the markers by promising them a Good Player Award
consisting of a big gold star, a bright red ribbon and a place to
print their name. Other children either performed the activity
without any reward or were told about the reward only after
completing the activity. Children who participated in these
three experimental conditions (expected reward, no reward,
unexpected reward) were then covertly observed during the follow-
ing week in a free-play period. As in the Deci (1971) study,
the amount of time children spent on the activity when they could
do other interesting things (e.g., playing with other toys)
was taken to be an indicator of intrinsic motivation.
The findings of the Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett study showed
that the introduction of an extrinsic reward for performing an
already interesting activity caused a significant decrease in
intrinsic motivation. Children who played with magic markers
with the expectation of receiving the external reward did not
"
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spend as much subsequent free time on the activity as did
children who were not given a reward or those who were un-
expectedly offered the reward. Moreover, the rated quality of
drawings made by children with the markers was significantly
poorer in the expected reward group than either the no reward
or unexpected reward groups.
The results of the Lepper et. al. study help to increase
our confidence in the findings of the earlier Deci (1971)
experiment. Not only are the earlier findings replicated with
a different task and subject population, but an important
methodological problem is minimized. By reexamining Table 2,
one can see that the second time period in the Deci experiment
was the period in which payment was expected by subjects for
solving the puzzles. However, one can also see that in Time 2
there was a whopping increase in the free time subjects spent
on the puzzles. Deci explained this increase as an attempt by
subjects to practice puzzle-solving so as to increase their
chances of earning money. However, what Deci did not discuss is
the possibility that the subsequent decrease in Time 3 was not
due to the prior administration of rewards, but due to the
effect of satiation or fatigue. One contribution of the
Lepper et. al. study is that its results are not easily explained
by this alternative. In the Lepper et. al. experiment, over a
week of time separated the session in which an extrinsic reward
was administered and the final observation period.
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Although both the Deci and Lepper et. al. studies support
the notion that the expectation of an extrinsic reward may
decrease one's intrinsic interest in an activity, there is still
one important source of ambiguity in both of these studies. You
may have noticed in both of these studies that the decrease
in intrinsic motivation follows not only the prior administration
of an extrinsic reward, but also the withdrawal of this reward.
For example, in the Deci study, subjects were not paid in the
third experimental session in which the decrease in intrinsic
motivation was reported. Likewise, subjects were not rewarded
when the final observation of intrinsic motivation was taken by
Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett. Thus, it is difficult to determine
whether the decrease in intrinsic interest in the task is due
to a change in the self-perception of motivation following the
application of an extrinsic reward or merely due to frustration
following the removal of the reward. An experiment by Kruglanski,
Preedman, and Zeevi (1971) helps to resolve this ambiguity.
Kruglanski et. al. (1971) induced a number of teenagers to
volunteer for some creativity and memory tasks. To manipulate
extrinsic rewards, the experimenters told half of the participants
that because they had volunteered for the study, they would be
taken on an interesting tour of the psychology laboratory,
while the other half of the participants were not offered this
extrinsic reward. The results showed that teenagers offered the
reward were less satisfied with the experimental tasks and were
.
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less likely to volunteer for future experiments of a similar
nature than were teenagers who w^re not offered the extrinsic
reward. In addition, the extrinsically rewarded group did not
perform as well on the experimental task (in terms of recall,
creativity, and the Zeigarnik effect) as the nonrewarded group.
These findings are similar to those of Deci (1971) and Lepper
et. al. (1973), but they cannot be as easily explained by a
frustration effect. Since in the Kruglanski et. al. study the
reward was never withdrawn for the experimental group, the
differences between the experimental (reward) and control (no
reward) conditions are better explained by a change in self-
perception than a frustration effect.
The designs of the three overly sufficient justification
studies described above have varying strengths and weaknesses
(see Calder and Staw, 1974) . However, taken together, their
results can be interpreted as supporting the notion that extrinsic
rewards added to an already inte esting task can decrease
intrinsic motivation. This effect, if true, would have important
ramifications for educational, industrial, and other work
settings. There are many situations in which people are offered
extrinsic rewards (e.g., grades, money, special privileges,
etc.) for accomplishing a task which may already be intrinsically
interesting. The self-perception effect means that, by offering
external rewards, we may sometimes be sacrificing an important
source of task motivation and not necessarily increasing either

39
the satisfaction or performance of the participant. Obviously,
because the practical implications of the self-perception
effect are large, we should proceed with caution. Thus, in
addition to scrutinizing the validity of the findings themselves
(as we have done above) , we should also attempt to determine
the exact conditions under which they might be expected to hold.
Earlier, Deci (1971, 1972) had hypothesized that only
rewards contingent on a high level of task performance are likely
to have an adverse effect upon intrinsic motivation. He had
reasoned that a reward which is contingent upon specific behavioral
demands is most likely to cause an individual to infer that his
behavior is extrinsically rather than intrinsically motivated,
and that a decrease in intrinsic motivation may result from this
change in self-perception. Although this assumption seems
reasonable, there is not a great deal of empirical support for
it. Certainly in the Kruglanski et. al. and Lepper et. al.
studies all that was necessary :> cause a decrease in intrinsic
motivation was for rewards to be contingent upon the completion
of an activity. In each of these studies, what seemed to be
important was the cognition that one is performing an activity
in order to get an extrinsic reward rather than a prescribed goal
for a particular level of output. Thus, as long as it is salient,
a reward contingency based upon the completion of an activity may
be able to decrease intrinsic motivation just like a reward
contingency based on the quality or quantity of performance.
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Ross (1974) recently conducted two experiments which dealt
specifically with the effect of the salience of rewards upon
changes in intrinsic motivation. In one study, children were
asked to play a musical instrument (drums) for either no reward,
a non-salient reward, or a salient reward. The results showed
that intrinsic motivation, as measured by the amount of time
spent on the drums versus other activities in a free play situation,
was lowest for the salient reward condition. Similar results
were found in a second study in which some children were asked
to think either of the reward (marshmallows) while playing a
musical instrument, think of an extrnaeous object (snow) , or
not think of anything in particular. The data for this second
study showed that intrinsic motivation was lowest when children
consciously thought about the reward while performing the task.
In addition to the salience of an external reward, there has
been empirical research on one other factor mediating the self-
perception effect, the existing iorms of the task situation.
In examining the prior research using situations of overly
sufficient justification, Staw, Calder, and Hess (1974) reasoned
that there is one common element which stands out. Always, the
extrinsic reward appears to be administered in a situation in
which persons are not normally paid or otherwise reimbursed for
their actions. For example, students are not normally paid for
laboratory participation, but the subjects of Deci (1971) and
Kruglanski et. al. (1971) were. Likewise, nursery school
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children are not normally enticed by special recognition or
rewards to play with an interesting new toy, but both Lepper
et. al.'s (1973) and Ross' (1974) subjects were. Thus, Staw,
Calder, and Hess (1974) manipulated norms for payment as well
as the actual payment of money for performing an interesting
task. They found an interaction of norms and payment such that
the introduction of an extrinsic reward decreased intrinsic
interest in a task only when there existed a situational norm
for no payment. From these data and the findings of the Ross
(1974) study, it thus appears that an extrinsic reward must be
both salient and situationaliy inappropriate for there to be a
reduction in intrinsic interest.
Re-assessing the Self-perception Effect
At present, there is growing empirical support for the
notion that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can be negatively
interrelated. The effect of extrinsic rewards upon intrinsic
motivation has been replicated by several researchers using
different classes of subjects (i.e., males, females, children,
college students), different activities (i.e., puzzles, toys),
and the basic results appear to be internally valid. However,
as we have seen, the effect of extrinsic rewards is predicated
upon certain necessary conditions (e.g., situational norms and
reward salience) . This is often the case with many psychological
findings which are subjected to close examination.
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To date, the primary data supporting the self-perception
prediction have come front situations of insufficient and overly
sufficient justification. Emx^irical findings have shown that
individuals may cognitiveiy re-evaluate intrinsic rewards in an
upward direction when their behavior is insufficiently justified,
in a downward direction when there is overly sufficient justification,
and, in general, it can be said that the data of these two
situations are consistent with the self-perception hypothesis.
Still, theoretically, it is not immediately clear why previous
research has been so restricted to these two particular contexts.
No doubt, it is easier to show an increase in intrinsic motivation
when intrinsic interest is initially low (as under insufficient
justification) or a decrease when intrinsic interest is initially
high (as under overly sufficient justification) . Nevertheless,
the theory should support a negative interrelationship of intrinsic
and extrinsic factors at all levels, since it makes the rather
general prediction that the gret ;er are the extrinsic rewards
the less likely will the individual infer that he is intrinsically
motivated.
Quite recently, there has been one empirical study which has
tested the self-perception hypothesis by manipulating both intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation. Calder and Staw (in press) experimentally
manipulated both the intrinsic characteristics of a task as well
as extrinsic rewards in an attempt to examine the interrelationship
of these two factors at more than one level. In the study,
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male college students were asked to solve one of two sets of puzzles which were
identical in all respects except the potential for intrinsic interest. One set
of puzzles contained an assortment of p r ctures which were highly rated by stu-
dents (chiefly from Life magazine but including several Playboy centerfolds)
,
while another set of puzzles was blank and rated more neutrally. To manipulate
extrinsic rewards, half of the subjects were promised $1.00 for their 20 minutes
of labor (and the dollar was placed prominently in view} , while for half of the
subjects, money was not mentioned nor displayed. After completing the task,
subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire on their reactions to the puzzle-
solving activity. The two primary dependent variables included in the question-
naire were a measure of task satisfaction and a measure of subjects' willingness
to volunteer for additional puzzle-solving exercises. The later measure con-
sisted of a sign-up sheet in which subjects could indicate the amount of time
they would be willing to spend (without pay or additional course credit) in
future experiments of a similiar nature.
The results of the Calder and Staw experiment showed a significant inter-
action between task and payment on subjects' satisfaction with the activity and
a marginally significant interaction on .subjects* willingness to volunteer for
additional work without extrinsic reward. These data provided empirical sup-
port for the self-perception effect in a situation of overly sufficient justi-
fication, but not under other conditions. Specifically, when the task was
initially interesting (i.e. using the picture puzzle activity), the introduction
of money caused a reduction of task satisfaction and volunteering. However,
when the task was initially more neutral (i.e. using the blank puzzle activity),
the introduction of money increased satisfaction and subjects' intentions to
volunteer for additional work. Thus, if we consider Calder and Staw's dependent
measures as indicators of intrinsic interest, the first finding is in accord
with the self-perception hypothesis, while the latter result is similiar to
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what one might predict from a reinforcement theory. The implications of these
data, together with previous findings, are graphically depicted in Figure 5.
Insert Figure 5 about here
As shown in the figure, shifts in the perception of intrinsic rewards
have only been found at the extremes of insufficient and overly sufficient
justification. Thus, it may be prudent to hold in abeyance the general hypothesis
that there is a uniformly negative relationship between the perception of intrinsic
and extrinsic rewards. Perhaps we should no longer broadly posit that the
greater are external rewards and pressures the weaker will be the perception
of intrinsic interest in an activity, and the lower are external pressures the
stronger will be intrinsic interest. Certainly, under conditions other than
insufficient and overly sufficient justification, reinforcement effects of
extrinsic rewards on intrinsic task satisfaction have readily been found
(see, e.g., Cherrington, Reitz, and Scott, 1971; Cherrington, 1973; Greene, 1974).
At present, it appears that only in situations of insufficient or
oversufficient rewards will there be attributional instability of such magnitude
that shifts will occur in the perception of intrinsic rewards. Thus, one
might speculate that either no attributional instability is evoked in other
situations or it is just not strong enough to overcome a countervailing force.
This writer would place his confidence in the latter theoretical position.
It seems likely that both self-perception and reinforcement mechanisms hold
true, but that their relative influence over an individual's task attitudes
and behavior varies according to the situational context. For example, only
in situations with insufficient or overly sufficient justification will one's
need to resolve attributional instability probably be so strong for external
rewards to produce a decrease in intrinsic motivation. In other situations,
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one might reasonably expect a more positive relationship between intrinsic
and extrinsic factors, as predicted by reinforcement theory. Although this
view of the interrelationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is
only speculative, it does seem reasonable in light of recent theoretical and
empirical work. Figure 6 graphically elaborates this model and shows how
the level of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation may depend on the character-
istics of the situation. In the figure, secondary reinforcement is depicted
to be a general force for producing a positive relationship between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation. However, under situations of insufficient and over-
sufficient justification, self-perception (and dissonance) effects are shown
to provide a second but still potentially effective determinant of a negative
interrelationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The figure
shows the joint operation of these two theoretical mechanisms and illustrates
their ultimate effect on individuals' satisfaction, persistence, and performance
on a task.
Insert Figure 6 about here
Implications of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
In this discussion we have noted that the administration of both
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards can have important effects on a person's
task attitudes and behavior. Individually, extrinsic rewards may direct and
control a person's activity on a task and provide an important source
of satisfaction. By themselves, intrinsic rewards can also motivate task
related behavior and bring gratification to the . individual . However, as we
have seen, the joint effect of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards may be quite
complex. Not only may intrinsic and extrinsic factors not be additive in
their overall effect on motivation and satisfaction, but the interaction of intrinsic
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and extrinsic factors may under some conditions be positive and
under other conditions be negative. As illustrated in Figures
5 and 6, a potent reinforcement effect will often cause intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation to be positively interrelated, although,
on occasion, a self-perception mechanism may be so powerful as
to create a negative relationship between these two factors
.
The reinforcement predictions of Figures 5 and 6 are consistent
with our common sense. In practice, extrinsic rewards are relied
upon heavily to induce desired behaviors, and most allocators of
rewards (e.g., administrators, teachers,- parents) operate under
the theory that extrinsic rewards will affect positively an
individual's intrinsic interest in a task. Thus, for brevity,
we should concentrate our attention on those situations in which
our common sense may be in error - those situations in which there
may in fact be a negative relationship between intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation.
Motivation in Educational Organizations
One of the situations in which .intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation may be negatively interrelated is our schools. As
Lepper and Greene (in press) have noted, many educational tasks
are inherently very interesting to students and would probably
be performed without any external force. However, when grades
and other extrinsic inducements are added to the activity, we
may, via overly sufficient justification, be converting an
interesting activity into work. That is, by inducing students
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into educational tasks with strong extrinsic rewards or by
applying external force, we may be converting learning activities
into behaviors which will not be performed in the future without
some additional outside pressure or extrinsic force.
Within the educational context, a negative relations?iip
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation poses a serious
dilemma for teachers who allocate external rewards. For example,
there is no doubt that grades, gold stars and other extrinsic
incentives can alter the direction and vigor of specific "in
school" behaviors (e.g., getting students to complete assigned
mathematics exercises by a particular date) . However, due to
their effect on intrinsic motivation, extrinsic rewards may also
weaken a student's general interest in learning tasks and
decrease voluntary learning behavior that extends beyond
the school setting. In essence, then, the extrinsic forces
which work so well at motivating and controlling specific task
behaviors may actually cause the extinction of these same
behaviors within situations devoid of external reinforcers.
This is an important consideration for educational organizations
since most of an individual's learning activity will no doubt
occur outside the formal classroom setting which is highly
1
regulated and reinforced.
In order to maintain students' intrinsic motivation in
learning activities it is recommended that the use of extrinsic
rewards be carefully controlled. As a practical measure, it is
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recommended that when a learning task is inherently interesting
(and would probably be performed without any external force)
that all external pressures upon the individual be minimized.
Only when a task is so uninteresting that individuals would not
ordinarily perform it should extrinsic rewards be applied.
In addition, it is recommended that the student role be both
enlarged and enriched so as to increase rather directly the
level of intrinsic motivation. The significance of learning
tasks, responsibility for results, feedback, and variety in
student activities are all areas of possible improvement.
Motivation in Work Organizations
Voluntary work organizations are very much like educational
organizations in that their members are often intrinsically
motivated to perform certain tasks and extrinsic rewards are
generally not necessary to induce the performance of many
desired behaviors. However, if for some reason extrinsic
rewards were to be offered to voluntary workers for performing
their services, we would expect to find, as in the educational
setting, a decrease in intrinsic motivation. Like the educational
context, we would expect that an external reward will decrease
self-motivated (or voluntary) behavior which extends to settings
free the external reinforcement, although the specific behaviors
which are reinforced might be increased. As a concrete example,
let us imagine a political candidate who decides to "motivate" his
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volunteer campaign workers by paying them for distributing flyers
to prospective voters. In this situation one might expect that
the administration of an extrinsic reward will increase the number
of flyers distributed. However? the political worker's subsequent
interest in performing other campaign activities without pay may
subsequently be diminished. Similarly, the volunteer hospital
worker who becomes salaried may no longer have the same intrinsic
interest in his work. Although the newly professionalized
worker may exert a good deal of effort on the job and be relatively
satisfied with it, his satisfaction may stem from extrinsic
rather than intrinsic sources of reward.
Let us now turn to the implications of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation for non-voluntary work organizations. Deci (1972) , in
reviewing his research on intrinsic motivation, cautioned
strongly against the use of contingent monetary rewards within
industrial organizations. He maintained that paying people
contingently upon the performance of specific tasks may reduce
intrinsic motivation for these activities, and he recommended
non-contingent reinforcers in their stead. As we have seen,
however, a decrease in intrinsic motivation does not always
occur following the administration of extrinsic rewards, and
certain necessary conditions must be present before there is
a negative relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Generally, industrial work settings do not meet these necessary
conditions.
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First, within industrial organizations, a large number of
jobs are not inherently interesting enough to foster high
intrinsic motivation. Persons would not ordinarily perform
many of the tasks of the industrial world (e.g., assembly line
work) without extrinsic inducements, and this initial lack of
intrinsic interest will probably preclude the effect of overly
sufficient justification. Secondly, even when an industrial job
is inherently interesting, there exists a powerful norm for
extrinsic payment. Not only do workers specifically join and
contribute their labor in exchange for particular inducements,
but the instrumental relationship between task behavior and
extrinsic rewards is supported by both social and legal standards.
Thus, the industrial work situation is quite unlike that of
either a voluntary organization or educational system. In the
former cases, participants may be initially interested in perform-
ing certain tasks without external force, and the addition of
overly sufficient rewards may convey information that the task
is not intrinsically interesting. Within industrial organizations,
on the other hand, extrinsic reinforcement jis the norm, and tasks
may often be perceived to be even more interesting when they
lead to large extrinsic rewards.
The very basic distinction between non -voluntary work
situations and other task settings (e.g., schools and voluntary
organizations) is that, without extrinsic rewards, non-voluntary
organizations would be largely without participants. Therefore,
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the important question for industrial work settings is not one
of payment versus non-payment, but of the recommended degree of
contingency between reward and performance. On the basis of
current evidence, it would seem prudent to suggest that, within
industrial organizations, rewards continue to be made contingent
upon behavior. This could be accomplished through programs of
performance evaluation, profit sharing or piece rate incentive
schemes. In addition, intrinsic motivation should be increased
directly via the planned alteration of specific job characteristics
(for example, by increasing task variety, complexity, social
interaction, task identity, significance, responsibility for
results, and knowledge of results)
.
A Final Comment
Although the study of the interaction of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation is a relatively young area within psychology,
it has been the intent of this paper to outline a theoretical
model and provide some practical suggestions based upon the
research evidence available to date. As we have seen, the effects
of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are not always simple, and
several mediating variables must often be taken into account (e.g.,
initial interest in a task and situational norms) before specific
predictions can be made. Thus, in addition to providing "answers"
to theoretical and practical problems, it is hoped that this work
may illustrate the complex task of drawing conclusions from a
limited body of research data. The only caution that is in order
is for the reader to regard the present theoretical propositions
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and practical recommendations as working statements which are
subject to the influence of future empirical evidence.
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Footnotes
1
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Bobby J. Calder and
Greg R. Oldham for their critical reading of the manuscript, and to
the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois for the
resources and facilities necessary to complete this work.
2
Although Lewin's construct of "resultant force" emphasized the goal
directed nature of motivation, its formulation did actually include
the intrinsic valence associated with a behavioral path as well as the
extrinsic ends of an action.
3
Clearly, any effort to change the motivation or behavior of another
individual implies certain ethical considerations. For example, as a
change agent, one must assess the likely consequences of a change
intervention, the results of not intervening, and the rights, both
legal and ethical, of the "target" individual. In the sections which
follow, several motivational strategies are described in terms of
increasing another person's intrinsic and/or extrinsic motivation to
perform a task. The examples which illustrate these strategies con-
sider the change agent to be someone in control of resources or other
sources of social power such as a task supervisor, educational instructor,
or group leader. Obviously, there may be alternative initiators of
change interventions (e.g. from workers, students, outside consultants),
and some of the strategies illustrated here may be (justifiably)
rejected by a change agent on the basis of local values and social norms.
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4
It is interesting to note that Kazin and Bootzin (1972) have
made a quite similar point in their recent review of research
on token economics. They noted that while operant conditioning
procedures have been quite effective in altering focal behaviors
within a controlled setting seldom have changes been found to
generalize to natural, non-reinforcing environments.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Total Number of Hours of Onward Performance by a Group
of 44 Patients Under Contingent and Uon-Contingent Reinforcement
Schemes. (Ayllon and Azrin, 196-5}
Figure 2: Task Determinants of Intrinsic Motivation.
Figure 3: A Conceptual Framework of Self-perception Theory.
Figure 4: A Schematic Analysis of the Self-perception of Intrinsic
and Extrinsic Motivation.
Figure 5: The Relative Potency of Self-perception and Reinforcement
Mechanisms.
Figure 6: The Interrelationship of Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Motivation as a Function of Situational Characteristics.
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Table 1. Summary of Expectancy X Value Theories. (Adapted from Korman, 1974)
Theorist
Lewin et al.
(1944)
Major Motivational Constructs
Subjective probability
of achieving desired
outcome
(Valence)
X Value of desired
outcome
Resul tant
Force
i?an
(1955)
Expectation of Demand level
achieving desired X for given
outcome outcome
Level of
given
out come
Perform
vector
, ds
(1955)
Subjective probability
of achieving desired
ou tcome
Utility of desired
outcome
Behavior
choice
;;er
(1954)
Expectancy of
achieving desired
re inforcement
Value of reinforce-
X ment
"*" Behavio:.
potential
Atkinson
(196S)
Probability of
achieving desired
outcome
Motive level
for achieving X
"esired outcome
Incentive
level of
desired
outcome
Resultant
motivation
"/room
(1964)
:ctancy of
achieving desired
outcome
(Valence)
Value of desired
outcome
Force
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Table 2. Mean number of Seconds Spent Working on the Puzzles During the
Free Time Periods. (From Deci, 1971)
Time 3-
Group Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 1
Experimental 248.2 313.9 198.5 -49.7
(n=12)
Control 213.9 202.7 241.8 27.9
(n-12)
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Figure 4
Perceived Extrinsic Rewards
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Figure 5
Perceived Extrinsic Rewards
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